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In re Nevada State Engineer Ruling No. 5823, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. No 22 (May 31, 2012)1
CIVIL PROCEDURE - WATER LAW AND SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Summary
Appeal from a district court decision dismissing a petition for judicial review of the State
Engineer’s ruling in a water rights action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Disposition / Outcome
The Court concluded that the NRS 533.450(1) does not vest exclusive jurisdiction in the
court of the county in which the applicant’s water rights are located. Rather, the statute
contemplates multiple potential forums, the selection of which turns on the “location, nature, and
origin of the interests allegedly affected.” Moreover, according to the Court, the general forum
clause in NRS 553.450(1) does not address subject matter jurisdiction, but rather, venue. The
Court vacated the jurisdictional dismissal and remanded the case to the district court for
determination of the motion to change venue.
Factual and Procedural History
The present case arises from State Engineer Ruling 5823, which allocated groundwater
rights in the Dayton Valley Hydrographic Basin (“the Basin”). The Basin is located wholly
within Lyon County.
Before the State Engineer, Appellants Churchill County and the Pyramid Lake Paiute
Tribe (“the Tribe”) protested applications for groundwater appropriations, arguing that the Basin
was “severely over-appropriated.” Specifically, the Appellants argued that due to the
hydrological connection between the Basin’s groundwater and the surface waters of the Carson
River, approval of the applications in Lyon County would deplete waters in which the Appellants
have an interest in neighboring Churchill County. Rejecting Appellants’ protests, the State
Engineer granted all pending applications in Ruling 5823.
Churchill County and the Tribe appealed the State Engineer’s decision, invoking NRS
533.450(1), which provides in pertinent part:
Any person feeling aggrieved by any order or decision of the State Engineer…
affecting the person’s interests… may have the same reviewed by a proceeding
for that purpose, insofar as may be in the nature of an appeal, which must be
initiated in the proper court of the county in which the matters affected or a
portion thereof are situated, but on stream systems where a decree of court has
been entered, the action must be initiated in the court that entered the decree.2
Reasoning that the “matters affected or a portion thereof” were located in Churchill County,
Appellants filed their appeals in the Third Judicial District Court in Churchill County. In
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addition, based on the clause of exception in NRS 533.450(1), the Tribe filed an appeal in the
federal court that issued the decree governing use of Carson River water (“the Alpine decree”).3
In response to the Third Judicial District Court appeals, the State Engineer filed a motion
to change venue.4 Additionally, Respondents Aspen Creek, LLC and Dayton Valley Investors,
LLC (collectively, “Aspen Creek”) filed a motion to dismiss, to which several other Respondents
joined, based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Citing NRS 533.450(1), both motions asserted that the Third Judicial District Court in
Lyon County represented “the proper court of the county in which the matters affected or a
portion thereof are situated,” as the applicant’s water rights are or would be located in Lyon
County. Appellants Churchill County and the Tribe disagreed, arguing that the district court in
either Churchill or Lyon County could hear the appeal because NRS 533.450(1) contemplates
more than one possible forum. Moreover, according to appellants, the phrase “matters affected,”
does not merely refer to an applicant’s interests, but rather, to the interests of a protestor as well.
Respondents asserted similar arguments before the Alpine decree court, seeking to
dismiss the Tribe’s parallel federal appeal. Ruling before the Third Judicial District Court, the
Alpine decree court rejected the Tribe’s argument that the court had jurisdiction to entertain the
appeal under the clause of exception in NRS 533.450(1).5 According to the Alpine decree court,
merely alleging that the State Engineer’s ruling affects federally decreed water rights is not
sufficient to establish the decree court’s jurisdiction. Instead, the court determined that NRS
533.450(1) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the court where the applicant’s water rights are
located. Thus, the Alpine decree court dismissed the Tribe’s appeal, finding that the district court
in Lyon County had jurisdiction because the Basin is located in Lyon County.
Taking judicial notice of the Alpine 2008 order, the Third Judicial District Court in
Churchill County agreed with the Alpine decree court, holding that the location of the applicant’s
water rights determines which court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a State Engineer’s
decision. As State Engineer Ruling 5823 granted or altered water rights of the applicants that are
located in Lyon County, the court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and dismissed
both appeals. Both Churchill County and the Tribe appealed.
In the interim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the Alpine 2008 order, basing
its decision on United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co.6 The 2010 Orr Ditch decision held that
where a protestor’s allegedly affected rights are federally decreed, the location of the applicant’s
water rights is not determinative of jurisdiction. Instead, the court concluded that the clause of
exception in NRS 533.450(1), providing for appellate review in the court that entered a decree, is
implicated where the State Engineer allocates groundwater rights in a manner that allegedly
diminishes the Tribe’s decreed water rights.
Discussion
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On Appeal, the sole issue before the court was whether NRS 533.450(1) granted the
Third Judicial District Court of Churchill County subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the
appeals of Churchill County and the Tribe.
Statutory Analysis
First, the court considered the plain meaning of NRS 533.450(1). The statute begins with
an introductory grant clause, which provides a right to judicial review to “any person feeling
aggrieved by any order or decision of the State Engineer” where the order or decision “affect[s]
the person’s interests.”7 The court determined the phrase “any person” to denote inclusiveness,8
thereby conferring a right of judicial review to both applicants and protestors.9
Following the introductory grant of a right to judicial review, NRS 533.450(1) proceeds
with a general forum clause – a judicial review proceeding “must be initiated in the proper court
of the county in which the matters affected or a portion thereof are situated.”10 According to the
Court, while the word “must” is mandatory, indicating that a judicial review proceeding must be
initiated in the proper forum, it does not follow that the clause signifies (1) that a given
proceeding must occur in a single court in a single county or (2) that the phrase “matters
affected” only contemplates the interests of an applicant. Rather, the phrase “or a portion
thereof” suggests multiple potential forums. Moreover, accepting the proposition that multiple
iterations of the same word in the same statute have the same meaning,11 the Court determined
that use of the word “affect” in both the introductory grant clause and the forum clause indicates
that the phrase “matters affected” refers to the interests of applicants and protestors alike.
Finally, NRS 533.450(1) includes a clause of exception – “but on stream systems where a
decree of court has been entered, the action must be initiated in the court that entered the
decree.”12 The Court concluded that the clause of exception reinforces the proposition that NRS
533.450(1) contemplates multiple potential forums – here, the decree court and the non-decree
court.
As such, the Court held that NRS 533.450(1) does not vest exclusive jurisdiction in the
court of the county in which the applicant’s water rights are located, but rather, contemplates
multiple potential forums the selection of which turns on the “location, nature, and origin of the
interests allegedly affected.”13
The Third Judicial District Court Decision and Ninth Circuit Precedent
Basing its decision on the later-vacated order of the Alpine decree court, the Third
Judicial District Court in Churchill County determined that the language of NRS 533.450(1) was
ambiguous, and that a literal reading of the statute produced an unreasonable result. The district
court reasoned that the legislature intended NRS 533.450(1), through the clause of exception, to
confer exclusive jurisdiction to a decree court where a State Engineer’s decision affects water
rights on decreed stream systems. According to the district court, absent this reading, a single
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decision could implicate interests relating to two different stream systems for which two
different courts have entered decrees. Based on the above consideration, the district court
concluded that accomplishing exclusive jurisdiction, requires courts to limit the phrase “matters
affected” to encompass the water rights of the applicant.
Here, the Court concluded that limiting jurisdiction to the court of the county in which
the applicant’s water rights are located would also create problems associated with multiple
potential forums. Moreover, such a limitation on jurisdiction would create a conflict between the
ongoing jurisdiction of a decree court and a second court’s assumed jurisdiction. According to
the Court, this is precisely the type of conflict that the legislature designed the clause of
exception in NRS 533.450(1) to mitigate.
To illustrate the problem, the Court turned to the Orr Ditch decision, which held that a
decree court has jurisdiction over an appeal where a State Engineer’s order or decision affects a
protestor’s senior, federally decreed rights.14 However, the decree court’s jurisdiction is limited
to an assessment of the affect of the State Engineer’s decision on the senior, federally decreed
rights, and if necessary, an order directing the State Engineer to correct any adverse affect.
Where an appeal implicates state decreed rights, according to the Orr Ditch court, the general
forum clause of NRS 533.450(1) governs jurisdiction.
While Orr Ditch primarily considered the jurisdiction of a federal decree court, the Court
determined that the district court’s decision that jurisdiction turns on the location of an
applicant’s water rights was inconsistent with Orr Ditch. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
Orr Ditch in Alpine Land and Reservoir Co., vacating the parallel decision of the Alpine Decree
court.15 Concluding that the Ninth Circuit’s precedent represented persuasive authority, the
Court rejected the district court’s interpretation of NRS 533.450(1) both due to the conflict it
created with Orr Ditch and within the statute itself.
Prior Nevada Supreme Court Precedent
Having determined that the location of an applicant’s water rights is not determinative of
subject matter jurisdiction under NRS 533.450(1), the Court considered whether its holding is
consistent with Jahn v. District Court.16 In Jahn, The Court held that the remedy provided by
section 75 (now NRS 533.450(1)) was exclusive, and that HLILP could not rely on section 36½
(now NRS 533.330(1)) or the inherent powers of the decree court to compel the State Engineer
to act as demanded. Thereafter, the Court recited the forum clause of section 75 (NRS
533.450(1)), and indicated that as the “matters affected” were located in Pershing County, the
district court in Humboldt County lacked jurisdiction. In the present case, the Court concluded
that the statement regarding jurisdiction was dictum. Moreover, the statement could not assist
Respondents, as all relevant water rights in Jahn were located solely in Pershing County.
Venue
Finally, the Court acknowledged both the general principle that jurisdiction over a single
interrelated system of water rights should be vested in a single court, and the practical difficulties
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Orr Ditch, 600 F.3d at 1160 (9th Cir. 2010).
United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 385 F. App’x 770, 771,72 (9th Cir. 2010).
58 Nev. 204, 73 P.2d 499 (1937).

associated with multiple courts exercising jurisdiction over such a system.17 However, the Court
concluded that the general principle does not represent an inviolable rule.18 Moreover, the Court
reasoned that the practical difficulties that arise where multiple courts exercise jurisdiction over
an interrelated system of water rights are diminished if one recognizes the general forum clause
in NRS 533.450(1) as addressing venue rather than subject matter jurisdiction. The Court then
compared procedures specified in various statutes to the general forum clause to demonstrate that
NRS 533.450(1) addresses venue. Additionally, the Court acknowledged that reading the general
forum clause in NRS 533.450(1) as establishing venue is consistent with the position of the State
Engineer,19 which in the context of a water law statute, represents persuasive authority.
However, the Court remanded to the district court for determination of venue, due to an
incomplete record and lack of a district court decision addressing venue.
Conclusion
The Court concluded that NRS 533.450(1) does not limit jurisdiction according to the
location of an applicant’s water rights. Rather, the phrase “matters affected” in the general forum
clause of NRS 553.450(1) refers to the interests of applicants and protestors alike. Moreover,
according to the Court, the general forum clause of NRS 533.450(1) does not address subject
matter jurisdiction, but rather, venue. Accordingly, the Court vacated the district court’s
jurisdictional dismissal, and remanded the case for determination of the State Engineer’s motion
for a change of venue.
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